











Agricultural production with change and uncertainty: a temporal case 






Jaakko Heikkilä and Jukka Peltola 
MTT Agrifood Research Finland, Economic Research 










Paper prepared for presentation at the 11
th International Congress of the EAAE  
(European Association of Agricultural Economists),  
The Future of Rural Europe in the Global Agri-Food System, 






Copyright 2005 by authors.  All rights reserved.  Readers may make verbatim 
copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided 
that this copyright notice appears on all such copies.  
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION WITH CHANGE AND 
UNCERTAINTY: A TEMPORAL CASE STUDY SIMULATION OF 
COLORADO POTATO BEETLE 
Jaakko Heikkilä and Jukka Peltola 
MTT Agrifood Research Finland, Economic Research, Helsinki, Finland 
 
Abstract 
Changes in climatic and policy environments combined with uncertainty related to stochastic 
environmental fluctuations make design of invasive pest policy challenging. These external changes 
are often exacerbated by changes in the species characteristics. We discuss facing local change and 
uncertainty when deciding ex ante on a specific policy strategy. Our empirical case deals with an 
invasive agricultural pest, Colorado potato beetle, and agricultural production in Finland. Invasions are 
modelled as temporally random events and stochasticity in key variables is built into the analysis. The 
viability of two specific policy options is evaluated given uncertainty and local change.  
Keywords: Colorado potato beetle, protected zone, zone protégée, invasive alien species.  




Uncertainty and change are facts of life, and should not come to anyone by surprise. However, to 
a greater extent we can take them into account in our actions, the better ground we are on. This applies 
not just to our personal behaviour, but also, and perhaps more importantly, to the various policies we 
choose to design and implement. We discuss agricultural production and policy when there is change 
and uncertainty regarding a specific environmental phenomenon: invasive pest species. The case we 
use for the empirical assessment deals with an invasive agricultural pest, Colorado potato beetle 
(Leptinotarsa decemlineata) (CPB) and potato production in Finland.  
Changes in local climatic conditions and agricultural policies and uncertainty related to stochastic 
environmental fluctuations make invasive pest policy relatively challenging to design and implement. 
These changes are often exacerbated by dynamic changes in the species characteristics. It is therefore 
no wonder that threats to animal and plant health by invading organisms are on the increase. About a 
quarter of all agricultural output is lost annually due to damages imposed by invasive pests or costs of 
their control (Schmitz and Simberloff, 1997). Globally, agricultural losses to introduced species are 
estimated at US$ 55-248 billion annually (Bright, 1999). In the case of Finland such changes affecting 
crop production seem significant in the near future.  
First, Finland’s membership in the European Union has opened borders and increased trade and 
movement of goods and people. Although pests such as the CPB may be carried by stormy winds, 
more unpredictable invasion pathways include transport with traded goods. Invasion pressure from 
this source has considerably increased with the increased Russian timber imports.  
Secondly, potential warming of temperatures may be changing environmental conditions in 
Finland (e.g. Jylhä et al., 2004). Temperature changes are larger close to polar areas and growing 
conditions both to plants and to their pests may be rapidly changing with the warming temperatures. 
The CPB seems to suffer somewhat from cold winters and especially from cold and short summers. 
However, with the changing weather, the threat from both increasing invasion pressure and permanent 
establishment of the CPB in Finland increase.  
Finally, agricultural practices and modifications in those practices in surrounding countries may 
also increase the invasion pressure. Large-scale use of pesticides in Russia and Poland initiate and 
speed up development of resistance to common pesticides. Also structural changes in Russia and 
Estonia have caused large number of private people to start subsistence potato production on small 
domestic plots, which may also affect the pests’ living conditions.  
Resulting from all this, the CPB invasion pressure is increasing in Finland. This increasing 
pressure must be accounted for when designing policy tools against the pest. This paper deals with ex-
ante assessment of possible costs of an invasion by the CPB into the Finnish agricultural network. 
Invasions are modelled as temporally random events and stochasticity in key variables is built into the  
analysis. Further, our analysis includes three trends that represent changes in climatic conditions and 
pest traits. In other words, uncertainty and local change are integral factors in the analysis.  
The main purpose of the current study is to evaluate the viability of two specific policy options 
when facing local and global change. The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section 
provides the basic background to the question by discussing uncertainty and change. The section after 
that constructs a theory-based economic simulation model of certain policy options, followed by a 
numerical evaluation. The final section draws some conclusions. 
 
Uncertainty and change 
 
We categorise existing uncertainty into three broad categories according to Heal and Kriström 
(2002), namely scientific, impact and policy uncertainty. We suffice ourselves here to highlighting the 
relationship of the CPB case study to uncertainty and change – the specifics of the case study are 
discussed later. We discuss each type of uncertainty in turn. 
First, we are uncertain of the invasion process and its pre-determinants in the points of origin in 
Russia. Certain weather patterns, including particular wind corridors, can be related to invasions, but 
the exact relationships of the various components are unknown. This can be seen as scientific 
uncertainty, which arises when a certain physical relationship is not known. 
Secondly, it is unknown how the continued invasions would affect the production patterns in 
Finland. Production may be regionally rearranged and new more tolerant plant varieties may be 
introduced. In the shorter term, also the impact of the beetle on potato yield is somewhat uncertain 
depending for instance on timing of the invasion, weather conditions and producer counter-measures. 
These can be seen as impact uncertainty, where the impacts of natural phenomena on the various 
components of human societies are uncertain, even if the physical science behind them is known. 
Finally, there is a third type of uncertainty, which can be categorised as policy uncertainty. It is 
related to questions such as: What type of policy should we undertake, and what are the conditions that 
determine the optimal policy? Does the optimal choice change over time and are there irreversibilities 
involved? In such questions, we may know the physical structure of problems, and how those affect 
the human societies, but we are still uncertain about the impacts of our own corrective actions. For 
instance, there is uncertainty related to which policies are needed to address the problems, how those 
policies impact on the issue in question and what are the costs of undertaking the policy. We answer 
some of these questions in our case study. However, the analysis is naturally restricted by how we 
choose to tackle scientific and impact uncertainty. 
Additionally, when modelling particular relationships involving naturally varying processes there 
may exist stochastic uncertainty, which is not amenable to learning. We solve this primarily by 
allowing for stochastic variability in key parameters, and undertaking the analysis with sufficient 
amount of iterations to accommodate various parameter combinations. 
Finally, there is imperfect knowledge about some (deterministic) key relationships or parameters. 
This so called parametric uncertainty is handled by using expert opinions in building the probability 
distributions for the parameters used in the analysis. We also undertake sensitivity analysis. 
Additionally, for discount rate and certain other model variables that are subject to value uncertainty, 
we try different values, as there do not exist commonly agreed values.  
Our policy problem has a temporal nature as it includes interactions between actions taken today 
and the impacts of those actions experienced in the future in light of uncertainty. Therefore, the 
temporality must be taken into account in the modelling exercise. The variables used in such models 
can be divided as follows (Kann and Weyant, 1999): 
1.  Set of physical state variables (economic and climatic indicators) [P] 
2.  Set of control variables (describing the policies) [C] 
3.  Set of information variables (in models that include learning) [I] 
In our model the physical [P] characteristics are updated at every period, whereas information [I] 
and control [C] variables are updated only at a limited number of periods – in our case solely in the 
first period. Thus our model can be considered to be a kind of Single-Period Decision Analysis model 
as categorised by Kann and Weyant (1999). In our case, instead of evaluating all (infinite) states of the 
world, we try to evaluate a large number of states for the two discrete policy alternatives. Furthermore, 
we analyse the reliability of the model through the following procedures:  
1.  Sensitivity analysis of key variables and their impact on results; 
2.  Sensitivity analysis on which variables affect the outcome most; 
3.  Discussion on which inputs we know least of. 
In addition to uncertainty, the analysis is further complicated by slowly incurring changes due to 
modified agricultural practices in surrounding countries, changes in temperatures and the generally 
increased trade and movement of goods. Due to change the factors which may already be uncertain to 
start with may further change over time, and these change parameters themselves are uncertain.  
We account for such local changes through three separate trends, where the mean value of the 
variable changes linearly. Changes analysed materialise in winter survival, invasion frequency and 
magnitude, and pesticide resistance of the pest. These represent on one hand changing climatic 
conditions and agricultural practices and on the other dynamic development of the pest population. All 




The model deployed is based on a pollution model by Barrett and Segerson (1997). The 
assumptions of the model are as follows: i) two alternative strategies are available; ii) control is only 
damage reducing; iii) strategies have no external costs or benefits; iv) producers are price-taking profit 
maximisers; v) price transfers may be imperfect, i.e. prices are allowed to vary due to the invasion; vi) 
the society is a risk neutral cost minimiser; and vii) the pest is host-specific and causes no ecological 
or food safety damage. 
 
Private objective  
 
The producer objective function for a representative producer in hectare i is (the time subscript t 
has been dropped in this section for clarity): 
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Production revenue is represented by  , i.e. the state-dependent producer price of the 
agricultural product (p
) ( i i S x q p
S) multiplied by the quantity produced (qi) which depends on inputs (xi) (with 
∂qi/∂xi>0). The properties of qi(xi) have no practical relevance for the model as long as they remain 
unaffected by the presence of the pest. The price depends on the magnitude of the invasion and the 
damage that has occurred (see equation 5 later). 
The pest damage function is  . The magnitude of damage (D) depends on the density of 
pest individuals in the production area (N
) ( i N D
i, with ∂D/∂Ni>0). Ni follows  ) , ( 0 0 i z i i i N p z N N η − = , 
where N0i is the number of pest individuals invading the i
th hectare, η is a parameter measuring the 
effectiveness of control inputs and zi is the per hectare quantity of control inputs, such as pesticides. 
Together ηzi measure the magnitude of pest individuals eradicated by the producer (reactive control) 
(with η,zi≥0, ∂D/∂η<0, ∂D/∂zi<0). The amount of control applied is dependent on the price of control 
pz and on the pre-control number of pest individuals in the production area. The resulting damage is 
proportional to the quantity produced in the absence of the pest, and is a figure between 0 and 1.  
Production costs are represented by  ) , ( 0i z i z i N p z p x + . The first term denotes the production 
costs in the absence of the pest. These non-control inputs (xi) are assumed to be a numeraire input, 
with price equal to unity. Note that any production subsidies are ignored. The second term is the 




In this setting, the society has to make a choice between the following two policy alternatives. 
  
Pre-emptive control:  () ∑
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Due to uncertainty regarding the magnitude of the pest invasion, it is appropriate to talk about 
expected total costs (E(TC)). These consist of the fixed costs of pre-emptive control (CF) and the 
variable costs of pre-emptive control (CVt). The latter depend on the area invaded (At), which is 
measured by the production hectares affected, and on the inspection visits It that are needed for control 
and surveillance (∂CVt/∂At>0, ∂CVt/∂It>0). 
It is also possible that the protection system has failed in the previous year, and some proportion 
of the area in the previous year is still invaded. The failure probability of the protection system is ωt, 
the proportion of the area remaining infected wt, and the winter survival of the beetle population θt. 
The annual costs are discounted at discount rate r and summed up over the years t = 1 to T. 
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The expected total costs consist of the expected change in producer surplus (∆PSt) plus the 
expected change in consumer surplus (∆CSt). Expected change in consumer surplus, due to the shift of 
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In equation (4) ATOT represents the total production area in the country. Equation (4) represents 
the losses experienced by the consumers due to invasion induced commodity price increase and 
reduced supply. The equation assumes that the demand curve is linear over the price range considered. 
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In other words, there is a base price p, which is then modified by the magnitude of the invasion 





D  (i.e., by how much supply is reduced), and the yield effect on price ε. 
The change in producer surplus is estimated through two different effects on the producer 
objective function, and considering the ensuing aggregate change in profit as the impact of the 
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This can be simplified into two effects as follows. The first effect is the damage and additional 
control costs inflicted on those producers whose farm is invaded. In other words, 
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The second effect is the subsequent price increase enjoyed by all producers, regardless of whether 
they have been subject to the invasion or not, 
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Given these policies, the degree of risk aversion is a factor that can potentially affect the policy 
choice and evaluation. Risk attitude is likely to be culture specific, and thus in case of a worldwide 
problem such as climatic change this factor may be important. For instance, the US is characterised as 
being an impatient society with high discount rate and high risk tolerance, whereas Europe and Japan 
are seen to be at the other end of the spectrum (Heal and Kriström 2002). In our case study we assume 
the society to be a risk neutral welfare maximiser (or, in fact, a cost minimiser). The problem of the 
risk neutral and welfare maximising society is thus to choose min  ( ) { } ) ( , 2 1 TC E TC E . 
 
The simulation study 
 
Background to simulation 
 
Invasive alien species affect the environment, natural resources and resource-based production in 
Finland as elsewhere. In agricultural production, Colorado potato beetle is one of the potentially most 
important pests. Traditionally the situation concerning invasive pests has been quite preferable, partly 
due to Finland’s isolated geographical location. However, as discussed earlier this situation is 
changing. This makes it important to analyse how possible protection policies function under uncertain 
and changing conditions. 
Protected zones are a voluntary black-list instrument for the member countries of the European 
Union (EU) to use if they wish to protect their production environment against specified invasive plant 
pests. This protection naturally carries a cost. The actions required include surveillance for the 
presence of the pest, labelling and import restrictions for plant products associated with the pest, 
eradication, disinfection and post-monitoring in the case of an invasion, and so forth. Often the 
benefits of not having the pest around outweigh these costs, but this is by no means inevitable 
(European Commission, 2000; EU, 2002; Mumford, 2002; MacLeod et al., 2005).  
In this study we evaluate the economic viability of the Finnish Colorado potato beetle protection 
system under uncertain and changing conditions. Alternatively, resources could be devoted to reactive 
control of the invading organism in order to reduce the impact of the invasion. Our framework consists 
of two possible actions, the currently used pre-emptive policy and reactive control as an alternative. 
These lead to two potential strategies that we evaluate: i) invest in pre-emptive control; or ii) allow 
invasion if it so happens and invest in reactive control. 
Pre-emptive control through the protection system involves reducing the likelihood of 
establishment through surveillance and co-ordinated eradication. The emphasis is on preventing 
establishment rather than the wind-borne invasion events per se. Reactive control is understood as 
producer application of control in the event of an invasion. Reactive control measures are not perfectly 
effective in that crop losses may still result. 
The economic costs in the strategies are as follows. In the case of pre-emptive control the 
economic cost consists of the fixed and variable costs of the protection system. The fixed costs consist 
of maintaining the appropriate infrastructure in order to swing into action when needed, as well as 
regular checks at the borders and on the fields to monitor the pest status. The variable costs are 
dependent on the invasion magnitude and consist of authority driven eradication of the pest and 
financial compensation for the producers. It is also possible that the protection system partially fails, 
and not all pests can be eradicated in any one year. In such a case those hectares are in the simulations 
added to the invaded area in the following year. 
In the case of reactive control two types of costs are considered. First, there are changes in 
producer surplus due to price changes, pest control costs and the value of lost production, caused by 
imperfect control or interim damage occurring before control application. Second, there may be 
changes in consumer surplus if product prices increase due to reduced supply. External damage to 
ecosystems or human health is ignored, as the beetle does not display such impacts.  
 
The cost data 
 
The planning horizon in the simulation is 50 years, during which time invasion events are 
assumed to take place randomly. The length of the analysed period is chosen to demonstrate the 
impact of changes, giving them sufficient time to materialise. At the end we also discuss the 
implications of the planning horizon actually chosen in policy making.  
In problems that deal with change the time horizon is often long or very long, implying the 
importance of the discount rate. Weitzman (2001) reports of a survey of 1,720 economists, who were 
asked which discount rate should be used in problems related to global warming. The median of their 
answers was 2% and the mean was 4% ± 3%. In our study we have chosen to use the 2% discount rate 
as the basis for evaluations, although we also test the significance of higher and lower discount rates. 
The cost estimates used in the analysis are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. The cost estimates used in the analysis.  
Cost  Estimate (€)  Source and notes 
PROTECTED ZONE  (PRE-EMPTIVE CONTROL): 
KTTK fixed costs:  37,827 € / year  Plant Production Inspection Centre (KTTK), based on 
costs in years 1999, 2000 and 2001. 
KTTK variable costs:    
i) inspection  256 € / visit  KTTK. Estimated from costs in years 1999-2004. 
ii) control substances  20 € / ha  KTTK. Estimated from costs in years 1999-2004. 
iii) compensation and 
eradication  610 € / ha  KTTK. Estimated from costs in years 1999-2004. 
NO PROTECTED ZONE (REACTIVE CONTROL) 
i) production losses 
10% of yield 
in infected 
areas 
Elsewhere (USA, Russia) crop losses of 15-20% have 
been reported. A lower figure is used due to temperature 
dependent feeding and the current low level of resistance. 
ii) control costs  100 € / ha  Estimate, includes costs of control substances and labour 
costs. In the USA, costs of up to 300 €/ha exist. 
iii) consumer effects  calculated 
Invasion induced price increases are assumed. Yield 
effect on price is taken to be -2 (10% yield reduction 
causes 20% price increase). The shock is assumed to stay 
for the duration of that year (Jalonoja and Pietola 2001). 
iv) trade effects  assumed zero  Finnish potato trade is at present very small scale activity. 
v) environmental costs  assumed zero  There are no direct environmental impacts. Impacts of 
control substances are not accounted for here. 
vi) health costs  assumed zero  If control substances are used in accordance with 
regulations there will be no health implications. 
 
Change in the case study simulation 
 
As discussed earlier, three trends are included in the analysis to account for local change. The 
first trend is increasing winter survival of the pest. Through local climatic change and changes in the 
beetle’s winter tolerance it is possible that the winter survival of the beetle population is getting better. 
In the simulation the change materialises through increases in the percentage of those who survive the 
winter. The winter survival variable is created for each time period as follows  
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In equation (10) θ_mean denotes the baseline winter survival and θ _trend is the trend variable 
that depends on the trend strength. We assume that in slow change, the winter survival increases in 50 
years from an average of about 30% to about 45%. In rapid change, the change is from 30% to about 
60%. Note that the mean follows the deterministic path, while stochastic annual variation is allowed 
around this mean.  
The second trend is increasing invasion pressure. Due to local and regional climatic change and 
advancement of the permanent beetle population towards north it is to be expected that invasions will 
become more frequent. In the simulations, the probability of an invasion increases through time. Also 
the average size of an invasion increases over time. 
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The interpretation of (11) and (12) is similar to that of (10). AINITt is the initial invaded area and γt 
the invasion probability. We assume that with slow change, the average size of an invasion increases 
from about 400 ha to about 600 ha. The annual invasion probability increases from about 33% to about 
50%. With rapid change, the average size of an invasion increases to about 800 ha. The annual 
invasion probability increases to 65%.  
The third trend is increasing pesticide resistance. The beetle is good at developing resistance 
towards different pesticides. Due to this the effectiveness of pesticides decreases and the costs 
increase. We show the impact of increasing pesticide resistance only through increasing costs of 
control, although in reality a larger share of beetle population would be likely to survive and hence 
spread the following year. Thus in the simulation the protected zone variable costs per hectare and the 
reactive control costs per hectare both increase. 
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In (13) and (14), CVt is the variable cost of protection and pzzit the reactive control cost. We 
assume that with slow change, the variable costs of protection increase in 50 years from 20 e/ha to 
about 40 e/ha. In reactive control the costs increase from about 100 e/ha to about 200 e/ha. With rapid 
change, the variable costs of protection increase in 50 years from 20 e/ha to about 50 e/ha. In reactive 
control the costs increase from about 100 e/ha to about 250 e/ha. 
In addition, in the case of all the trends, the increasing pressure also materialises through increase 
in the failure probability ωt of the protection system, and increase in the area in which protection fails 
wt. The failure probability increases from 30% to 100% in about 47 years, and the invaded area in 
which protection fails from 20% to about 70%.  
 
Applying the formulae 
 
The initial invasion magnitude is expected to be on average similar to the invasion in 2002, i.e. 
within the total production area of 29100 ha: i) about 1600 ha is inspected (5.5%); and ii) about 400 ha 
is controlled (1.4%). These magnitudes are, however, allowed to vary stochastically, as well as 
incorporate change through changing mean values. 
To calculate the total expected costs in different scenarios we use the equations developed in the 
theoretical section. The formulae used in the calculations become as follows. 
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In the simulations, it is the area invaded, not the pest population, which grows. In the protected 
zone strategy, it is assumed that the pest can be prevented from establishing, albeit a certain proportion 
of the population may survive to the next year.  
The probability of invasion γt is modelled in the simulation such that in any given year there 
either is an invasion or there is not. The probability then affects the frequency of invasions. For 
instance, if the probability is 0.33, on average there is an invasion every third year.  
The controlled area and inspection visits depend on the invasion magnitude in the present year 
AINITt (i.e. how large is the invasion coming from outside the system) as well as on the area of the 
protection system that is being carried over from previous years ωt-1 wt-1 θt-1 At-1. The inspection visits 
depend multiplicatively on the area controlled. 
The cost of pre-emptive control is thus affected by the invasion magnitude, the frequency of 
invasion years, and the extent of a possible failure in the previous year’s protection. The invasion 
frequency has an impact in two ways: first, by dictating whether there is an invasion or not in a 
particular year (direct effect), and second, by the fact that there may be remnants of previous invasions 
still existing in the network (indirect effect). The cost of the protection system thus varies in time 
depending on how often and to what extent preventative actions are needed. 
In the case of reactive control, two pest spread scenarios are analysed. Scenario 1 assumes 
logistic spread and Scenario 2 linear spread. As a special case we discuss the situation in which there 
is no winter survival. In addition to spread of the existing population, new random invasions are 
allowed just like in the case of pre-emptive control. The difference equation for the development of 











































γ                     (16) 
 
Change in the area comprises of possible new invasions plus spread of the existing population. 
The term sINITt accounts for the fact that the pest spreads already in the first year in the case of reactive 
control. This is because it is foreseeable that without authority enforced control, the beetle manages to 
spread into a wider area already in the initial year of invasion. In the case of pre-emptive control, this 
first year spread is not taken into account, as it is assumed that the coordinated and timely control 
measures can curb any spread. Hence, the initial year invaded area is always somewhat larger in the 










 accounts for the fact that if the existing size of the invasion is already large, 
it is less likely that any new invasion would add to the infected area. Hence the size of the new 
invasion is weighted by the proportion of available unaffected area. Finally, note that only a given 
proportion of the population (θt) survives the winter and is able to continue spreading. 
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In equation (17),   is the additive spread variable, i.e. the hectarage added each year due to 
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Reactive control costs consist of changes in producer and consumer surpluses. Producer surplus 
change consists of damages and control costs incurred (first term in the numerator) and the additional 
income due to invasion induced price increase (second term). The loss of consumer surplus is due to 
the price increase (third term). Note that some of the terms in (19) cancel out. We have maintained the 
division between consumer and producer effects in order to analyse the division of policy costs.  
In the simulations stochastic variation is allowed in invasion events (on/off), production losses, 
annual control and inspection magnitudes, spread rates, winter survival, and protection system success. 
The variable values used are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Parameter and variable values and the symbols used. 
Parameters and Variables  Symbol  (Mean) Value  Variance 
Production losses (%)  Dt 0.10 0.005 
Reactive control costs per hectare (€)  pzzit 100 - 
Pre-invasion producer price (€)  p  0.20 - 
Yield effect on price  ε  -2 - 
Base production quantity per hectare (kg)  q  24400 - 
Discount rate (%)  r  0.02 - 
Fixed costs of the protection system (€)  F1 36222 - 
Miscellaneous fixed costs (€)  F2 1605 - 
Inspection cost per visit (€)  V1 256 - 
Pre-emptive control substance costs per ha (€)  V2t 20 - 
Eradication and compensation per ha (€)  V3 610 - 
Total hectarage (ha)  ATOT 29100 - 
Initial control magnitude (ha)  AINITt 400 20000 
Annual hectarage controlled (ha)  At varies >  0 
Inspection multiplier  g  4 - 
Annual inspection visits (visits)  It g * At > 0 
Invasion induced price increase (€)  dpt -D*p*ε*At/ATOT > 0 
Invasion probability (%)  γt 0.33 - 
Spread multiplier in first year  sINITt 1.5 0.05 
Spread multiplier in nonlinear spread  st 1.8 0.4 
Spread area in linear spread (ha)  lin
t s   400 10000 
Proportion of population that survives winter (%)  θt 0.3 0.02 
Failure probability of protection system  ωt 0.3 - 
Failure area of protection system  wt 0.2 - 
Trend multiplier in invasion magnitude (low/high)  AINIT_trend  1.01/1.02 - 
Trend multiplier in invasion probability (low/high)  γ_trend  1.01/1.02 - 
Trend multiplier in winter survival (low/high)  θ_trend  1.01/1.02 - 
Trend multiplier in V2 (low/high)  CV_trend  1.10/1.20 - 
Trend multiplier in pz zi (low/high)  pz zi_trend  1.02/1.04 - 
Trend multiplier in failure probability  ω_trend  1.05 - 





The analysis was conducted for 300,000 iterations in order to have a sufficient representation of 
various parameter combinations. The results are reported below. We will first discuss the number of 
cases preferring each strategy, followed by discussion on mean, minimum and maximum costs 
involved. We then conclude the results section by discussing benefit cost ratios (BCRs) before moving 
to sensitivity analysis. Finally, we discuss briefly intertemporal and intratemporal division of the costs. 
 
Table 3. Cases (%) where the strategy has a lower cost than the other strategy. 
Cases %  Scenario  Pre-emptive control  Reactive control 



















Table 3 depicts the number of iterations (cases) in which one of the strategies imposes lower 
costs than the other. For instance, in the case of all trends set at ‘slow’, in 85.8% of the iterations, pre-
emptive control imposes lower costs than reactive control. In other words, on average in 85.8% of 
different realisations of future, pre-emptive control is the more economical choice. 
As is evident, whenever there is winter survival of the pest and some anticipated change, pre-
emptive control is the cost minimising strategy in 31-100% of the cases. The trends thus enhance the 
profitability of protection. On the other hand, if we assume that there will be no changes in the future, 
or that the pests die for certain over the winter (results not shown in the table), it seems that it would 
be economically sensible to abandon the protection system. However, in the presence of uncertainty, 
these results have to be supplemented by looking at the mean, median, minimum and maximum costs 
of the strategies, as depicted in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. The discounted present value costs in each strategy and scenario. 
Reactive Control  Costs    Pre-emptive 
control  Scenario 1  Scenario 2  No winter survival 
Mean (€)  9,878,500  8,241,800  8,260,200  3,822,400 
Median (€)  9,826,300  8,016,200  8,185,500  3,760,500 
Min (€)  3,586,700  581,660  1,510,900  284,870 
No trend 
Max (€)  17,898,000  29,159,000  18,518,000  9,731,700 
Mean (€)  14,383,000  18,385,000  13,707,000  6,067,400 
Median (€)  14,339,000  17,717,000  13,617,000  6,011,300 
Min (€)  6,435,200  3,466,600  4,718,300  876,250 
Slow trend 
Max (€)  23,627,000  95,834,000  26,245,000  13,692,000 
Mean (€)  20,127,000  51,275,000  21,975,000  8,923,400 
Median (€)  20,104,000  47,051,00  21,850,000  8,873,100 
Min (€)  11,099,000  11,172,000  10,652,000  2,488,900 
Rapid trend 
Max (€)  30,084,000  236,710,000  37,753,000  17,276,000 
 
The trends unambiguously increase the costs of both strategies, but increase the costs of reactive 
control relatively more. This is also evident from looking at the number of cases where pre-emptive 
control is cheaper in Table 3. This is because, given the trends, the pest is able to spread to larger 
areas, survive the winters better and hence result in larger costs in reactive control.  
Further, the differences in mean cost estimates are not very large in the context of ‘no change’ 
and to some extent in ‘slow change’. In the case of rapid change, the differences become larger. 
Finally, if there is no winter survival, costs are unambiguously lower with reactive control than with 
pre-emptive control (but note that the two figures in the table cannot be directly compared, because the 











Protection Scen 1 Scen 2
All no All slow All rapid
 
Figure 1. Mean costs of protection and reactive control (two scenarios) at different levels of change. 
 
As for the variability of the cost estimates, it is remarkable how the costs vary from the minimum 
cost of Scenario 1 under ‘no change’ of less than 600,000 euro (or less than 300,000 euro in the case 
of no winter survival) to the maximum cost of Scenario 1 under ‘rapid change’ of nearly 240 million 
euro over the 50 year period. This would be unfortunate if we had no way of knowing which state is 
likely to materialise.  
However, it is possible to look at the distribution of costs and make subjective evaluations as to 
how that impacts on policy considerations. Figure 2 depicts the probability density functions of net 
benefits of protection under the two scenarios (i.e. costs of reactive control minus the costs of pre-
emptive control) under slow change. The x-axis measures the net benefits (in euros) and the y-axis the 
probability of those net benefits materialising.  
Note the relatively long tail on the RHS of Scenario 1, indicating that high net benefits (which 
can also be interpreted as risks of giving up protection) are rare but possible. In the case of Scenario 2 
the net benefits are more evenly distributed, with relatively many iterations producing negative net 
benefits, implying that in those cases it would be profitable to give up protection. 
 





















Figure 2. Distribution of net benefits of protection under Scenario 1 (left) and Scenario 2 (right) 
 
Another way to look at the results is to compute the benefit cost ratios. Here the figures are BCRs 
for pre-emptive control. Thus the ratio is produced by dividing the benefits of the protection system 
(i.e. avoided reactive control costs) by the costs of the protection system. It measures by how much one 
of the strategies is more economical than the other. For instance, the mean ratio of 1.27 for ‘slow 
change’ means that giving up pre-emptive control would be on average 1.27 times more expensive 
than continuing with it. BCR less than one hence implies that protection is not economical. These 
calculations are presented in Table 5, where the ratios are displayed for each scenario and trend. The 
mean ratios under different levels of change are also presented in Figure 3. 
  
Table 5. The benefit cost ratios of each strategy and scenario. 
B:C RATIOS    Scenario 1  Scenario 2 
NO CHANGE  Mean 0.82  0.84 
 Minimum  0.16  0.29 
 Maximum  2.48  1.48 
SLOW CHANGE  Mean 1.27  0.95 
 Minimum  0.47  0.48 
 Maximum  6.38  1.52 
RAPID CHANGE  Mean 2.54  1.09 
 Minimum  0.86  0.71 
 Maximum  11.41  1.60 
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Figure 3. Benefit cost ratios of the two scenarios at different levels of change. 
 
Again it can be seen that the trends strengthen the viability of the protection system. The results 
can also be compared to those of Mumford et al. (2000), who estimated a BCR of about 7.5 for the 
British CPB protected zone. At the extreme the protection system is about 6 times more expensive 
than reactive control (minimum BCR in Scenario 1 under no change). At the other extreme reactive 
control is about 11 times more expensive than protection (maximum BCR in Scenario 1 under rapid 
change). However, again most of the results support the protected zone, provided that there is or will 
be some change and some winter survival.  
 
Sensitivity and uncertainty analysis  
 
Sensitivity analysis was conducted for a wide range of values. The results revealed that the 
variables that were fairly insignificant include the reactive control cost and the fixed costs of the 
protection system. The variables that were significant include winter survival, logistic spread rate and 
the variable cost of protection. Some results are presented in Table 6.  
 
Table 6. The sensitivity analysis ‘elasticity’ values. 








Mean cost          
Protection  0.00 0.19-0.20  0.91-0.92 0.00  0.00  0.92 
Scenario  1  0.64-0.72 1.44-3.31  0.99-1.01 1.26-2.92  0.23  0.00 
Scenario  2  0.64-0.72  0.80-1.00  0.68 0.00 0.23  0.00 
B C   - r a t i o           
Scenario  1  0.64-0.72 1.30-2.99  0.07-0.16 1.26-2.91 0.23-0.24  -0.63-1.69 
Scenario 2  0.64-0.72  0.63-0.77  -0.16-0.42  0.00  0.23  -0.63-1.68 
  
The figures in Table 6 are ‘elasticities’ indicating by how much the mean costs (first row) or BCR 
(second row) will change given a change in the column variable. For instance, a figure of 1.44 means 
that a 1% increase in winter survival would increase the mean costs by 1.44%. The range of values 
given is due to different outcomes arising from changes of different sizes in the column variable.  
To illustrate the impact of one variable that is important also in terms of possible future change, 
Figure 4 depicts the impact of different levels of winter survival on the mean BCRs. It should be noted 
that allowing, for instance, 100% winter survival would imply that the BCR would be ca. 27 in 
Scenario 1 and ca. 12 in Scenario 2, suggesting very high costs for giving up the protection system. 
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Figure 4. Benefit cost ratios with different levels of winter survival. 
 
Intertemporal and intratemporal issues 
 
Intertemporal issues include questions such as how costs are distributed among years, what is the 
impact of the discount rate, and whether we should be concerned about large initial investment or 
large costs later on. Real option values clearly matter in the analysis of policy measures. There are two 
types of option value impacts with contradictory implications. First, by waiting and not acting now, we 
could learn information about the true impacts of local change, for instance that they might be smaller 
than initially expected. Thus we could formulate better policy later on, instead of currently having to 
invest in expensive abatement. Second, by acting now in a precautionary way and preserving the 
current conditions we may avoid the irreversibilities that are associated with change in the future, for 
instance if it is possible that impacts can be greater than initially expected. (Heal and Kriström 2002) 
Intertemporal costs can be analysed by looking at the annual costs of the strategies, either 
discounted or not discounted. In the current version of the paper, we show in Figure 5 the annual net 
benefits of protection (cost of reactive control less the cost of protection) discounted at 2% and given 
slow change. From the diagram it can be seen that the protected zone can be seen as an investment that 
may produce negative net benefits in the early years, but given change the discounted net benefits may 
increase rapidly over time. This is because the benefit of protection, i.e. preventing the spread of the 
pest, results in greater cost savings in the future. 
 












Scenario 1 Scenario 2  
Figure 5. Annual net benefits of protection with slow change.  
 
The strategy choice also has distributional (intratemporal) effects. Given imperfect potato 
markets, possible invasion induced price increases unambiguously lead to losses in consumer surplus. 
An invasion would also affect the distribution of profits within the producers. Hence in the case of 
reactive control, the distributional effects depend on the area invaded (and hence crop lost) and on 
how the price responds to the invasion.  
The pre-emptive strategy too has to be funded by some means. If it is the taxpayers that end up 
paying the bill, they in essence are subsidising the producers. Further division is between those 
producers that have been subjected to the invasion and those who have not. Those unaffected may 
even benefit from the presence of the pest, if the prices increase. However, this benefit may be short-
sighted, as the risk of the invasion to also these production areas naturally increases.  
Figure 6 displays the division of mean costs under different levels of change to producers and 
consumers/taxpayers. The cost to consumers is displayed to the right of zero point on the horizontal 
axis, and the cost to producers to the left of the zero point. The costs to producers vary from zero to 
about minus 20 million euro. In other words, the producers on aggregate will benefit from the invasion 
due to prices increasing more than the costs of reactive control and crop losses. Note, however, that 
the cost to consumers is always larger than any possible benefit to producers, making the total impact 
of the invasion negative as expected.  
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Figure 6. The intratemporal division of policy costs. 
 
It should be observed that any assumptions regarding the price response to the invasion do not 
affect the costs of the two policies – they only impact on the division of those costs. Hence in an 
analysis of mere aggregate costs the price response assumption is trivial. 
If distribution of costs matters, the overall strategy choice depends on the relative magnitudes of 
the consumer and producer effects, and how these are weighted. We have assumed similar weights for 
both groups, but in reality the case may be that one of the groups is given more weight in decision 
making. We have assumed the consumers/taxpayers to carry the full costs of the protection system. It 
can naturally be the case that the producers are made to contribute towards these costs. A clear 
conclusion nonetheless is that in real-life policy environment it is important to consider how the 




In the only other economic analysis of the CPB protection system that we are aware of, Mumford 
et al. (2000) analyse the case of England. They argue that in Britain early potatoes are not at risk, 
hence no crop losses will result but extra management activities need to be undertaken. The costs they 
analyse comprise of monitoring and chemical treatment. They come up with a BCR of 7.5. Our results 
give somewhat smaller ratios – even less than one in some cases. The difference in results is largely 
due to different assumptions used. For instance, the area to which Mumford et al. (2000) assume the  
pest to spread within England is fairly small, and it would not also result in any crop losses, which we 
according to our current understanding find to be a somewhat arguable assumption. Further 
differences are in assumptions regarding winter survival, uncertainty and change. However, even 
given these key differences, the estimates are reasonably close to each other. 
The establishment of an invasive pest is to a large extent an irreversible event, as subsequent 
eradication is – if not impossible – at least prohibitively expensive. The real option values enter the 
problem in two ways: as a ‘precautionary principle’, suggesting we should avoid potentially 
irreversible environmental changes until we know more about their impacts, and as an ‘inverse 
precautionary principle’, suggesting we should avoid undertaking expensive policies with irreversible 
investments until we know more about what is needed (Heal and Kriström 2002). However, 
irreversibility as well as related option value of non-invaded area will be left for later study. 
In many occasions preventative actions are a good choice of strategy. Even if the protection 
system might not succeed in keeping the pest out of the country, it could still reduce the impact of the 
invasion or postpone the moment that we have to give it up. However, no strategy is automatically 
preferred in all circumstances. Pre-emptive control seems to be sub-optimal in cases where there are 
high costs of pre-emptive control compared to its benefits. This is especially so if there is an 
exogenous factor (temperature) automatically eradicating the population at regular intervals.  
The current version of the paper presents work that is still ongoing. Hence the analysis here is 
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